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We analyse how the wholesale electricity market deregulation could modify exchanges between 
three Canadian regions (Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick) and two U.S. regions (New York 
and New England), which were already trading electricity before the regulatory change took 
place in 1997.  We find that the pre-1997 exchanges already made possible fuel cost savings of 
$397.2 million per year while deregulation adds annual savings of $358.7 million.  Canadian 
regions are the main beneficiaries under the assumption that exports are priced at the marginal 
costs of the importing regions.  Imports from the Canadian regions, although significant, are not 
large enough to lower the marginal costs of the U.S. regions.  Hence electricity deregulation 
across the border should not significantly decrease prices in the U.S. regions although the latter 
are becoming more dependant upon imports from Canada.  Greenhouse gas emissions increase 
by 4.3 Mt CO2 eq. in the wake of the open wholesale electricity market because of the low cost 
of coal, particularly in Ontario.  Environmental concerns and the limited availability of 
additional hydroelectric power in Canada could change the trade patterns as electricity demand 
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Introduction 
The U.S. wholesale electricity market is open to competition since January 1997 through FERC 
Order 888 which allows producers, local distribution utilities or any FERC licensed marketers to 
exchange electricity at market prices.  FERC imposed some reciprocity conditions upon foreign 
applicants that required the latter to give access to their transmission power grid along the lines 
adopted for the U.S. wholesale market.  Canadian electric utilities, which are mostly owned by 
the provinces, applied for and received their FERC licences to participate in this new open 
market.  Electricity was already flowing across the border between the two countries before the 
structural change.  In 1996, Canada exported 42.2 TWh (terawatt-hours) i.e. 7.7% of its total 
production and purchased only 1.1 TWh
1. The net export in Canada favour follows from the price 
differentials between the two countries.  For instance, the 1996 average prices were 15.2¢/kWh in 
New York and 14.1¢/kWh in New England, while they were respectively 7.3, 4.9 and 6.3¢/kWh 
in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick, which are the northern contiguous neighbors
2.  The low 
Canadian prices are due to their reliance on hydro power and to public ownership
3. 
 
In Canada, the deregulation of the U.S. wholesale market of electricity is seen as an opportunity 
for its electric power industry to increase its profit due to the cost advantage, the flexibility of 
hydro power production and the seasonal complementarity between the summer peak demand in 
the United States and the winter peak demand in Canada
4. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the price and trade effects for the five aforementioned 
regions, resulting from the seamless border created by deregulation.  Because there were already 
significant exchanges across these five regions, it is of interest to assess the incremental trade 
coming out of the new context.  Particular attention is paid to the direction of the power flows, the 
identification of transmission bottlenecks between regions, CO2 emissions, the overall cost 
savings and their distribution among the five regions.  The identification of critical factors such as 
                                                 
1  There was a combination of firm exchanges (electricity available at all times during the period of agreement) and 
interruptible exchanges (electricity available under the agreement that the delivery could be interrupted at the option 
of the supplier). 
2  Values are expressed in Canadian $.  The Canadian $ was worth 0.73 U.S.$ in 1996. 
3  For an analysis of the effects of public ownership on the price of electricity in the Canadian context, see Bernard 
and Thivierge (l988). 
4  See National Energy Board (2003).   2
the costs of fossil fuels facilities and the limited availability of hydro resources points to some 
impending problems as the demand for electricity continue to grow. 
 
Our analysis differs and complements the study realized by Hale et al. (2000).  The latter probed 
the effects of electricity market deregulation in PJM, ECAR, New York and New England by 
considering individual generation plants and the transmission links to the load during the summer 
peak hour only.  Their purpose was to measure the effects on the marginal costs of delivering 
power to the local load and to identify transmission bottlenecks.  The regional emphasis was put 
on New York and New England and they identified significant transmission bottlenecks in 
western New York and in northern New England.  Exchanges with Canada, which are larger than 
the exchanges with the U.S. neighbors, are not included.  We focus on electricity exchanges 
between regions across a seamless border.  Each region has a given annual load to serve, a set of 
available generating capacities with their associated fuel costs and interconnections to 
neighboring power grids.  The year is divided into four uneven periods: winter peak (300 hours), 
spring (3930 hours), summer peak (600 hours) and fall (3930 hours).  The stepwise representation 
of the load curve and the presence of hydro power plants with limited energy allow us to capture 
the specific role of hydro power.  Exchanges with producers located outside the five regions of 
interest are taken as given and they are set at their pre-97 levels. 
 
The presentation proceeds as follows: in section one, we describe the underlying analytical 
framework and we underline key features of the data that enter into the cost minimization 
problem.  In section two, we present and discuss the results in order to highlight the potential role 
that could be played by electricity market deregulation.  Toward this end, we build three 
scenarios: the first scenario assumes that each region has to satisfy its load with its own power 
plants only, that is, each region operates under autarky.  In the second scenario, exchanges with 
the contiguous neighbors are set at their pre-97 levels.  In the third scenario, all the available 
resources are pooled together to meet the load in each of the five regions subject to constraints 
imposed by generating capacities, interconnection capacities and hydroelectric resources.  It is 
assumed that deregulation would lead to free trade and to overall cost minimization.  In the fourth 
section, we discuss some impending problems related to growing concerns with respect to   3
environmental protection and the link to average fuels costs and to the limited availability of new 
indigenous power sources. 
 
Here are the main findings that can be drawn from our three scenarios: the pre-97 exchanges 
made possible fuel cost savings of $397.2 million per year for the five regions and they reduced 
CO2 emissions by 9.8 Mt CO2 eq. or 6.1% relative to autarky.  Free trade brings additional fuel 
cost savings of $358.6 million per year or 7.5% of total fuel cost, while CO2 emissions go up by 
4.3 Mt CO2 eq.
5 or 2.9% relative to the pre-97 exchange scenario.  If we assume that electricity 
exports are sold at prices equal to the marginal costs of the importing regions, we find that the 
bulk of the cost savings translates into higher profits for Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick 
while New England and New York receive much smaller gains.  As Hale et al. (2000), we also 
find significant transmission bottlenecks toward New England that has relatively high fuel costs.  
The direction of power flows depends upon the order of the fuel costs associated with different 
types of generating equipment.  Environmental concerns, particularly related to greenhouse gas 
emissions, are likely to change these fuel costs and no relief is to be expected from new hydro 
power due to the mature state of its development. 
 
Section one: The analytical framework and electricity market information 
In order to capture the short-term effects associated with the 1997 deregulation of the U.S. 
wholesale electricity market, we use the 1998 data on load, available generating capacities, 
average fuel costs, and interconnection capacities.  Under the three scenarios which are called 
respectively autarky, pre-97 exchanges and free trade, we assume that available generating 
resources are used to minimize the total fuel cost of satisfying the load of each region while 
taking into account the constraints related to generating capacities, interconnection capacities and 
available hydroelectricity.  The results of the three cost minimization problems
6 yield the optimal 
use of the generating capacities in each region and the trade flows during the four periods of the 
year. Some relevant economic information is embodied in the marginal costs of serving the load 
of each region. 
 
                                                 
5 Mt = 10
6 tons and CO2 eq. = CO2 equivalent. 
6  Matlab is used to solve the cost minimization problems.   4
We now present a brief description of the data that enter into these cost minimization problems.  
This helps to understand the nature of the analysis and also to interpret the results associated with 
different trade rules. 
 
Table 1 shows our stepwise representation of the load curve in MW(megawatts) within each of 
the five regions.  Canadian regions have winter peak demand due to electrical space heating, 
while New York and New England have summer peak load due to air conditioning.  Altogether 
the five regions face a winter peak load. 
 
The upper part of Table 2 displays the available generating capacity by region.  Hydro generating 
capacity represents 41.7% of the total; this is due mostly to Quebec where hydro power plants 
account for 94.1% of its total capacity.  Its hydro power stations are backed by large reservoirs 
which are filled by spring runoff and which store water for the rest of the year until the next cycle 
starts; the production from such hydro power plants is very flexible.  In terms of relative 
importance, hydro generating capacity is followed by oil (24.0%), nuclear (14.5%), coal (11.1%), 
natural gas (6.4%) and other (2.2%).  We assume other generating capacities
7 to be must-run units 
and their utilization rates are based on recent experiences.  The last line of Table 2 shows the total 
electricity (TWh) that can be produced by the hydro power stations.  In order to remove some of 
weather randomness, we average hydroelectric output over the three years period, 1994, 1995 and 
1996, prior to market deregulation.  The 262.3 TWh produced by hydro power plants represent 
42.6% of overall electricity demand (616.03TWh) of the five regions in 1998. 
 
Finally, if we compare the peak demand in each region with the local generating capacity, we see 
that no region is short of capacity.  So the immediate benefit of electricity market deregulation is 
to give access to power stations that have lower generating costs. 
 
Table 3 shows the average fuel costs by generating type in each region and the latter follow more 
or less this increasing order: hydro, nuclear, coal, oil and natural gas.  However, there are some 
exceptions: natural gas average costs are less than oil average costs in Quebec and Ontario.   
Furthermore, oil in New Brunswick (1884MW) is cheaper than coal in New England (3311MW).  
                                                 
7  Geothermal, solar, wind and biomass.   5
Interconnection capacities between contiguous regions appear in Table 4.  Figure 1 shows the 
geographical layout of the high voltage interconnections that link the power grids of the five 
regions.  Quebec occupies a pivotal position and it has large interconnections with all its 
neighbors.  In general, the north-south interconnections of the three Canadian regions to the U.S. 
power grids are larger than the east-west interconnections among themselves.  This is expected 
due to the seasonal complementarity of the power grids along the north-south axis.  The size of 
the interconnections that link the five regions can be considered to be large when they are 
compared to what exists elsewhere in North America.  Nonetheless, if we set aside New 
Brunswick that has much smaller generating capacities than the other four regions, we see that 
interconnection capacities are small relative to the peak demand in each region.  This limits the 
role that competition from outside sources can play in each region and the extent that marginal 
costs can be equalized in the new deregulated market. 
 
Table 5 shows our estimates of the net electricity exchanges as they existed before 1997.  We can 
observe that Quebec was a net exporter to all its neighbors, particularly to New England and New 
York.  New England, which is a high cost region, was receiving power from its three neighbors, 
including New York that was also getting electricity from all its other neighbors.  Although 
Ontario had small electricity imports from Quebec, overall it is a net exporter to New York and to 
its other neighbors. 
 
It is of interest to analyse how these trade flows could be changed in the wake of the wholesale 
electricity market deregulation.  In order to keep the problem at a manageable scale without 
limiting unduly the validity of the analysis, we take as given the exchanges with power grids 
other than the five regions included in the study.  This information is shown in the lower part of 
Table 5. 
 
Section two: Results and analysis 
Now we turn to the presentation of the results.  For each scenario i.e. autarky, pre-1997 exchanges 
and free trade, we show the optimal use of the generating capacities, total CO2 eq. emissions   6
associated with coal, oil and natural gas uses
8, the total fuel cost and the marginal costs of 
providing one more kWh during the four periods of the year in each region.  Furthermore, under 
the assumption that export prices are equal to marginal costs of the importing regions, we 
compute the profit changes of each region as we move from autarky to pre-1997 exchanges and 
then to free trade. 
 
Table 6 displays the production and the CO2 emission under autarky.  We observe that Quebec 
has more than enough hydro resources available to meet its own demand.  Hence it has no CO2 
emission and its marginal cost is nil in each period of the year as it is seen in Table 10.  All other 
regions make full use of their available hydro resources.  The fuel cost of nuclear power is very 
low and as a result, the available nuclear capacity is also fully used in Ontario, New Brunswick, 
New England and New York.  Electricity generated from coal is the marginal source in Ontario 
(2.07¢/kWh) while oil is the marginal source in New Brunswick (2.37¢/kWh), in New England 
(3.15¢/kWh) and in New York (3.02¢/kWh).  The cost of electricity produced from natural gas is 
high relative to other sources that are sufficient to satisfy the load in each region.  The low 
marginal costs of the Canadian regions show that the latter had a definite cost advantage over the 
U.S. regions before any trade is taking place.  Total CO2 emissions are 159.6 Mt CO2 eq. and they 
originate from New York (65.9 Mt CO2 eq.), New England (55.6 Mt CO2 eq.), Ontario (32.2 Mt 
CO2 eq.), and New Brunswick (5.8 Mt CO2 eq.). 
 
When we move from autarky to the pre-1997 exchanges, it can be seen in Table 7 that production 
increases in the Canadian regions (+21.6TWh) at the expense of the two U.S. regions (-21.6TWh)  
Quebec gets the largest production increase, i.e. 18.4TWh, and now it uses not only all its 
available hydroelectric resources, but also all its nuclear and natural gas generating capacities; 
even its oil generating capacity, which is its marginal source, is fully utilized in the winter and in 
the summer peak period.  As it can be seen from Table 10, Quebec marginal cost is higher than in 
any other region and in that sense, its net exports are too high.  The marginal costs of the other 
four regions stay unchanged relative to autarky.  This leaves open the possibility of gains from 
trade as long as the interconnections have no bottlenecks. 
                                                 
8  Here are the CO2 emissions (Mt CO2 eq. /TWh) by source: coal : 0.975, oil : 0.778 and natural gas : 0.511.  
    See Gagnon (2000).   7
 
The pre-1997 exchanges reduce CO2 emissions from 159.6 Mt CO2 eq. under autarky to 149.8 Mt 
CO2 eq., i.e. 9.8 Mt CO2 eq.  The CO2 emissions go down in New England (-10.3 Mt CO2 eq.) 
and New York (-6.6 Mt CO2 eq.).  However they increase in Quebec (+4.0 Mt CO2 eq.), Ontario 
(+2.7 Mt CO2 eq.), and New Brunswick (+0.3 Mt CO2 eq.). 
 
As it can be seen in Table 11, the total fuel cost savings made possible by the pre-1997 exchanges 
are $397.2 million.  Fuel costs decrease in the two U.S. regions while they increase in the three 
Canadian regions.  If we assume that export prices are set equal to the marginal costs of the 
importing regions, Table 12 reveals that the Canadian regions are the main beneficiaries of the 
exchanges while Quebec gets $343.2 million out of the $397.2 million and that the U.S. regions 
obtain very little benefits.  Here is the reason why the benefit distribution is so lopsided: Quebec 
has some low cost hydro and nuclear capacities available under autarky while the pre-1997 
exchanges reduce production in the two U.S. regions, but not enough to lower their marginal costs 
which are set equal to import prices. 
 
Table 8 shows that free trade decreases further production in New England (-18.04TWh) and in 
New York (-12.26TWh) and increases production in Ontario (+21.89TWh) which has some low 
cost coal generating capacity and in New Brunswick (+13.27TWh) which makes use of low cost 
oil generating capacity.  Due to its high cost, the oil generating capacity in Quebec cannot meet 
the competition (-4.87TWh).  CO2 emissions move in the same direction as production, however 
they increase in total from 149.8 Mt CO2 eq. to 154.1 Mt CO2 eq.  This is particularly the case in 
Ontario (+21.3 Mt CO2 eq.) and in New Brunswick (+10.3 Mt CO2 eq.). 
 
As it is expected, free trade make marginal costs more equal across the five regions, however they 
are not completely equalized due to interconnection bottlenecks.  Table 9 points out the congested 
interconnections.  As it can be seen from the lower part of Table 10, the low marginal cost regions 
are Ontario, which has cheap coal production, and New Brunswick where the cost of electricity 
production from oil is low.  Both regions are attempting to displace the high oil cost of New 
England facilities either directly or indirectly through Quebec and New York which act as 
intermediaries.  New York and Quebec that are linked by large interconnections, share the same   8
marginal costs while there are still marginal costs differences between New Brunswick and 
Ontario on one hand and New England on the other hand.  It should be remembered that this 
result depends on the average fuel costs by generating type as presented in Table 3.  Different fuel 
costs could change trade flows. 
 
Table 11 shows that free trade makes possible additional fuel cost savings of $358.7 million per 
year relative to the pre-1997 exchanges.  The last row of Table 12 presents the distribution of 
these savings under the assumption that export prices are set equal to the marginal costs of the 
importing regions.  Again the Canadian regions are the main beneficiaries.  New England receive 
$35.2 million while New York receives almost no gain because its marginal cost based on oil 
production stays unchanged. 
 
Section three: Problems on the horizon 
The main result of our analysis is that free trade in the wholesale electricity market between the 
U.S. Northeast and Canada provides significant benefits to Canadian producers that have low cost 
generating facilities while congested interconnections create barriers to the complete equalization 
of marginal costs. 
 
The results depend on the average fuel costs as they were presented in Table 3; changes in these 
costs could redirect trade flows and give rise to congestion at other interconnections.  One of the 
main factors behind the benefits accruing to Canada as a result of electricity market deregulation 
is the fact that large coal generating facilities in Ontario have a lower average cost than the coal 
generating plants in New England and New York.  In December 2002, Canada ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol and now it is committed to lower greenhouse gas emissions to minus 6% below their 
1990 level over the first test period of the protocol, i.e. 2008 to 2012.  Electricity from fossil fuels 
is singled out as an activity that is expected to make a significant contribution to greenhouse gas 
emission reduction.  The New England states and New York are also planning to decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions.  However, they are not constrained by the fairly short horizon imposed 
by the Kyoto Protocol.  Furthermore, concerns with respect to air quality in large cities in 
Southern Ontario jeopardize further the use of coal generating plants that are located in this area.  
As the situation tightens in Ontario, this province may turn to import as it was doing just before   9
the mid-August massive blackout.  It must also be recalled that nearly half of Ontario nuclear 
generating capacity is out of service while it is being retrofitted or waiting for a decision in this 
respect.  Cost overrun is casting a long shadow over this prospect.  So Ontario which used to have 
excess generating capacity, may become a net importer. 
 
We have seen that hydro resources make a significant contribution to the load in the five regions 
and Quebec occupies the leading position in this regard.  Hydro resources provide a mean to 
perform arbitrage operations between peak and off-peak use and hence contribute directly to 
electricity price equalization over the course of the year.  Thus far, hydro power sites have been 
developed according to the increasing order of their costs.  The stage in Quebec has been reached 
where the costs of undeveloped hydro resources are about equal to the cost of natural gas power 
plants.  So no major contribution from additional hydro power should be expected.  Natural gas is 
becoming the fuel of choice for new power plants in the five regions and trade will be directed not 
so much by cost differentials but by seasonal load diversity. 
 
Conclusion 
A cost minimization framework of serving the load subject to physical constraints is used in this 
paper to analyse how the deregulation of the wholesale electricity market could change trade 
flows between three Canadian regions (Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick) and two U.S. 
regions (New York and New England), which were already trading electricity before the 
regulatory change took place in 1997.  We associate wholesale electricity market deregulation 
with price taking behavior and cost minimization.  This is how a well functioning competitive 
market is supposed to operate.  However, experience with electricity market deregulation has 
shown that there are some reasons why electricity markets may not lead to that kind of behavior.  
First, transmission pricing may interfere with cost minimization at the production level.  Second, 
when the limits imposed by interconnection capacities are binding, producers may reduce output 
from low cost production units in favour of high cost units to increase the market clearing prices 
in the constrained markets.  Third, hydro resources, which are quite flexible, could also be shifted 
around to influence the prices in some constrained markets
9.  This is why our estimate of fuel cost 
savings under wholesale market deregulation should be considered as an upper bound.  However, 
                                                 
9  See Bushnell (2003).   10
we think that the analysis is still valid in providing a reasonable estimate of the fuel cost savings 
and of their distribution across a seamless border.  Furthermore, the results point to some 
upcoming problems as the growing electricity demand puts pressure on available resources that 
are more and more constrained due to environmental concerns.   11
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Table 1 
1998 Demand (MW) 
 
Period Quebec
1    Ontario   New Brunswick   New England   New York  Total 
Winter   (300 h) 
Spring    (3930 h) 
Summer (600 h) 
Fall        (3930 h) 
34 295      22 330            3 333               19 800             24 150 
20 461      16 087            1 668               12 428             16 132 
20 461      21 387            1 668               22 100             28 960 
20 461      16 087             1 668              12 428             16 132 
103 908 
  66 776 
  94 576 
  66 776 
   Estimated by the authors from North American Reliability Council (1998, 1999). 
1   For Quebec, we use the 1999 data due to the 1998 ice storm. 2300 MW of generation for own use by private companies are 







1998 Available generating capacity (MW) and hydroelectricity (TWh) 
 









  37 996
1        8 034              919                     3 599               5 470 
       675         8 728
2             680                     4 365               4 981 
         --          7 797               570                     3 311               3 262 
    1 596         2 302
3           1 884                   11 930            14 600 
         37         1 803                --                       1 858               4 959 
         90            334               511                     1 599                  469 
  40 394       28 998            4 564                   26 662             33 741 
 56 018 
 19 429 
 14 940 
 32 312 
   8 657 




6      39.818            3.000                    4.380              24.930  262.268 
    Source (Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick) : Statistics Canada (1998a) and Statistics Canada (1994, 1995, 1996). 
               (New England and New York) : U.S. Energy Information Administration (1994, 1995, 1996, 1998). 
    1   Due to a long term contract, 5 428 MW from Churchill Falls in Labrador are included in Quebec capacity. 
    2   Total nuclear generating capacity is 13 864 MW. Bruce A (2 060 MW) and Pickering A (3 076 MW) nuclear power plants     
          have been take out of service. See Ontario Power Generation (2002) 
    3    Oil or natural gas can be used as fuel. 
    4    Geothermal, solar, wind and biomass 
    5    Average hydroelectricity production (TWh) in  1994, 1995 and 1996. 
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Table 3 
1998 Average fuel costs (¢/kWh) 
 






     0.00           0.00                0.00                    0.00                 0.00 
     0.18           0.23                0.18                    0.18
1                0.18
1 
       --             2.07                2.35                    2.68                 2.20 
     3.86           3.22                2.37                    3.15                 3.02 
     1.86           3.09                  --                      4.23                 3.93 
    Source (Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick) : Statistics Canada (1998b). 
                (New England and New York) : U.S. Energy Information Administration (1998). 




2000  Interconnection capacity (MW) 
 






     --              1 195             1 200                  2 303                  2 695 
   550                --                    --                        --                     2 325 
   785                --                    --                       815                      --   
1 670                --                   815                      --                    1 600 
1 000             1 300                 --                    1 425                      --   
  7 393 
  2 875 
  1 600 
  4 085 
  3 725 
Total  4 005             2 495             2 015                  4 543                 6 620  19 678 
    Source (Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick) : Canadian electricity association and natural resources Canada (1999). 
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Table 5 
Net electricity exchanges before 1997 (MW) 
 
Within the five regions 
From / to  Winter  Spring  Summer  Fall 
Quebec                    Ontario 
                                New Brunswick 
                                New England 
                                New York 
     75 
   505 
1 116 
   858 
      54 
    253 
 1 073 
    701 
        72 
      253 
   1 073 
      701 
      54 
    253 
 1 073 
    701 
Ontario                    Quebec 
                                New Brunswick 
                                New England 
                                New York 
     -- 
     -- 
     -- 
   450 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
   370 
        -- 
        -- 
        -- 
      415 
     -- 
     -- 
     -- 
    370 
New Brunswick      Quebec 
                                Ontario 
                                New England 
                                New York 
     -- 
     -- 
   217 
     -- 
      -- 
      -- 
   315 
      -- 
        -- 
        -- 
      315 
        -- 
      -- 
      -- 
    315 
      -- 
New England          Quebec 
                                Ontario 
                                New Brunswick 
                                New York 
     -- 
     -- 
     -- 
     -- 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
        -- 
        -- 
        -- 
        -- 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
New York               Quebec 
                                Ontario 
                                New Brunswick 
                                New England 
     -- 
     -- 
     -- 
   130 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
   119 
        -- 
        -- 
        -- 
      107 
      -- 
      -- 
      -- 
    119 
Outside the five regions 
Ontario                    Michigan 
                                Minnesota 
                                Others
1 
   242 
     20 
       2 
   535 
      7 
    19 
      933 
        17 
        17 
    535 
      19 
      19 
New Brunswick      Nova Scotia and 
                                Prince Edward Island 
 
   233 
 
  117 
 
      117 
 
    117 
Others
2                    New York     400    251        447      251 
    Estimated by the authors from Electric Power in Canada (1997), Statistics Canada (1998c), New York Power Pool  
    (2000),  National Energy Board (2002) 
    1 Mostly to Pennsylvania 
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Table 6 
Production and CO2 emission: autarky 
 
                                               (MW) 





















  34 235       20 401           20 401         20 401  
  0                0                    0                  0     
  --                --                   --                 --     
  0                0                    0                  0 
  0                0                    0                  0  
   60             60                  60                60      
  34 295      20 461           20 461         20 461     
  182.86    
     0.00     
         -- 
     0.00     
     0.00     
     0.53     
  183.39   
            0 
            0 
           -- 
            0 
            0 
           -- 
















   6 899        4 273             6 942           4 273     
   8 728
1       8 728
1            8 728
1         8 728
1    
  6 757         3 459             6 474           3 459 
         0               0                     0                  0 
  0               0                     0                  0 
  131            131                131              131     
  22 515       16 591           22 275        16 591     
    39.82 
    76.46     
   33.10     
     0.00     
     0.00     
      1.15    
 150.52     
            0 
            0 
      32.2 
            0 
            0 
           -- 
















  674            341                202             341     
  680
1          680
1               680
1            680
1    
  570
1          570
1               570
1            570
1    
  1 538              90                229               90     
--               --                   --                  -- 
  104            104                104             104      
  3 566         1 785             1 785          1 785     
     3.00     
     5.96     
     4.99     
     1.31     
          -- 
     0.91     
    15.26   
            0 
            0 
         4.9 
         1.0 
           -- 
           -- 
















  1 862            325             2 108             325     
  4 365
1       4 365
1            4 365
1         4 365
1    
  3 311
1       3 311
1            3 311
1         3 311
1    
  9 107        3 272            11 161          3 272     
  0               0                    0                  0 
  1 155        1 155              1 155          1 155      
  19 800      12 428            22 100        12 428     
     4.38     
   38.24     
   29.00     
   35.14     
     0.00     
   10.12     
  106.77   
            0 
            0 
       28.3 
       27.3 
            0 
           -- 
















  3 467        2 630              5 367          2 630      
  4 981
1      4 981
1             4 981
1         4 981
1    
  3 262
1       3 262
1             3 262
1         3 262
1    
  11 697        4 665            14 560          4 665     
   0               0                    0                  0 
   343           343                 343             343      
  23 750      15 881            28 513        15 881     
   24.93     
   43.63     
   28.58     
   48.91     
     0.00     
     3.00     
  146.05    
            0 
            0 
       27.8 
       38.1 
            0 
           -- 
       65.9 
Total  103 926      67 146            95 134        67 146       616.03           159.6 
1  Maximum generating capacity 
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Table 7 
Production and CO2 emission: pre-1997 exchanges 
 
                                                       (MW) 





















   34 481          21 333          20 192      21 333    
        675
1              675
1             675
1          675
1   
         --                  --                   --              --      
     1 596
1              437            1 596
1         437    
          37
1                37
1               37
1            37
1   
          60                 60                 60             60    
   36 849          22 542          22 560      22 542    
 190.14     
      5.91     
          -- 
     4.87     
     0.32     
     0.53     
  201.77   
           0 
           0 
          -- 
        3.8 
        0.2 
          -- 
















     7 134            4 258            7 013        4 258    
     8 728
1           8 728
1          8 728
1       8 728
1   
     6 897            3 790           6 746         3 790    
            0                   0                  0                0    
            0                   0                  0                0    
        131               131              131            131    
   22 890          16 907         22 618       16 907    
   39.82     
   76.46     
   35.90     
     0.00     
     0.00     
     1.15     
  153.33   
           0 
           0 
      35.0 
           0 
           0 
          -- 
















        633               339              248            339    
        680
1              680
1            680
1           680
1   
        570
1              570
1            570
1           570
1   
     1 291               154              245            154    
         --                   --                 --               -- 
        104               104              104            104    
     3 278            1 847           1 847         1 847    
     3.00     
     5.96     
     4.99     
     1.75     
          -- 
      0.91     
    15.70  
           0 
           0 
        4.9 
        1.4 
          -- 
          -- 
















            0               557                  0            557    
     4 365
1           4 365
1          4 365
1       4 365
1   
     3 311
1           3 311
1          3 311
1       3 311
1   
     9 506            1 533          11 774        1 533    
            0                   0                  0                0 
     1 155             1 155          1 155         1 155    
   18 337           10 921        20 605        10 921   
     4.38     
   38.24     
   29.00     
   21.96     
     0.00     
   10.12     
    93.59  
           0 
           0 
      28.3 
      17.1 
           0 
          -- 
















            0             2 842          4 318         2 842    
     4 981
1           4 981
1         4 981
1        4 981
1   
     3 262
1           3 262
1         3 262
1        3 262
1   
   13 986             3 501        14 600
1        3 501    
            0                   0                  0                0  
        343                343             343            343    
   22 572           14 929        27 504       14 929    
   24.93     
   43.63     
   28.58     
   40.47     
     0.00     
     3.00     
 137.61     
           0 
           0 
      27.8 
      31.5 
           0 
          -- 
      59.3 
Total   103 926           67 146        95 134       67 146       616.03          149.8 
1  Maximum generating capacity 
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Table 8 
Production and CO2 emission: free trade 
 
                                                    (MW) 





















  35 327           21 177          21 814      21 177    
  675
1               675
1              675
1          675
1   
--                    --                  --              --       
  0                     0                  0               0     
  37
1                  37
1              37
1            37
1    
  60                   60               60             60     
  36 099            21 949        22 586      21 949     
 190.14     
     5.91     
          -- 
     0.00     
     0.32     
     0.53     
  196.90 
            0 
            0 
           -- 
            0 
         0.2 
           -- 
















  8 034
1             4 146          8 034
1      4 146     
  8 728
1             8 728
1        8 728
1      8 728
1    
  7 797
1              6 461         7 797
1       6 461     
  0                     0                0               0 
  0                     0                0               0 
  131                 131            131           131     
  24 690             19 466       24 690      19 466     
   39.82     
   76.46     
   57.80     
     0.00     
      0.00     
     1.15     
  175.22    
            0 
            0 
       56.3 
            0 
            0 
           -- 

















1                302            583           302     
  680
1                680
1           680
1          680
1   
  570
1                570
1           570
1          570
1   
 1 884
1             1 729         1 448         1 729    
        --                     --               --               --       
 104                  104            104           104     
  4 157              3 385          3 385        3 385     
     3.00     
     5.96     
      4.99     
   15.02     
          -- 
     0.91     
    28.97   
            0 
            0 
         4.9 
       11.7 
           -- 
           -- 
















  3 599
1                145          3 599
1          145    
  4 365
1             4 365
1        4 365
1       4 365
1   
  3 311
1             3 311
1        3 311
1       3 311
1   
  2 827                     0          5 127               0    
  0                     0                 0               0 
  1 155               1 155         1 155        1 155     
  15 257               8 976       17 557        8 976     
     4.38     
   38.24     
    29.00     
     3.92     
     0.00     
   10.12     
   75.55     
            0 
            0 
       28.3 
         3.1 
            0 
           -- 
















  537               2 867          3 730       2 867     
  4 981
1             4 981
1         4 981
1      4 981
1   
  3 262
1              3 262
1         3 262
1      3 262
1   
  14 600
1             1 917        14 600
1       1 917    
  0                      0                 0               0 
  343                 343              343           343    
  23 723            13 370         26 916      13 370    
   24.93     
   43.63     
   28.58     
   28.21     
     0.00     
     3.00     
 125.35     
            0 
            0 
       27.8 
       21.9 
            0 
           -- 
       49.8 
Total  103 926            67 146          95 134     67 146      616.03           154.1 
1  Maximum generating capacity 
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Table 9 
Origin and destination of electricity under free trade 
 
                                                                    (MW) 
From  / To     Winter          Spring        Summer      Fall 
(TWh) 






  33 572       19 126           19 298      19 126      
    378            550
1               378           550
1    
   0            785
1               785
1         785
1      
  0                0                    0               0       
  344               0                    0               0       
   34 295       20 461          20 461       20 461      
  171.98 
      4.66 
      6.64 
      0.00 
      0.10 
  183.39 




    0                0                   0               0 
   22 515       16 591          22 275       16 591      
            0                0                   0               0 
   22 515       16 591          22 275       16 591    
      0.00 
  150.52 
      0.00 
  150.52 




     224                0                   0               0       
  3 342         1 785            1 785         1 785      
         0                0                   0               0       
   3 566         1 785            1 785        1 785     
      0.07 
    16.10 
      0.00 
    16.17 





     2 303
1        1 755            2 303
1       1 755      
        815
1           815
1              815
1         815
1     
  15 257         8 976          17 557        8 976       
   1 425
1           882            1 425
1         882       
  19 800       12 428          22 100      12 428  
    15.86 
      7.14 
    85.66 
      8.22 
  116.88 





          0         1 069               984        1 069       
    1 797         2 325
1           2 037       2 325
1      
  0                0                   0              0 
 21 953       12 487          25 491      12 487       
  23 750       15 881          28 513      15 881     
      8.99 
    20.04 
      0.00 
  120.03 
  149.06 
Total  103 926       67 146          95 134      67 146         616.03 
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Table 10 
Marginal cost (¢ / kWh) 
 
Scenario / Region  Winter          Spring        Summer      Fall 
Autarky                Quebec 
                               Ontario 
                               New Brunswick 
                               New England 
                               New York 
  0.00              0.00             0.00         0.00 
  2.07              2.07             2.07         2.07 
  2.37              2.37             2.37         2.37 
  3.15              3.15             3.15         3.15 
  3.02              3.02             3.02         3.02 
Pre-1997                Quebec 
                               Ontario 
                               New Brunswick 
                               New England 
                               New York 
  3.86              3.86              3.86        3.86 
  2.07              2.07              2.07        2.07 
  2.37              2.37              2.37        2.37 
  3.15              3.15              3.15        3.15 
  3.02              3.02              3.02        3.02 
Free trade               Quebec 
                               Ontario 
                               New Brunswick 
                               New England 
                               New York 
  3.02              3.02              3.02        3.02 
  3.02              2.07              3.02        2.07 
  3.02              2.37              2.37        2.37 
  3.15              3.02              3.15        3.02 




Fuel cost of electricity production ($ million) 
 




    0.0            861.1             159.1                  1 953.2             2 184.4         5 157.8 
204.6            919.1             169.5                  1 538.0             1 929.5         4 760.6 




Profit changes  ($ million) 
 
From / to  Quebec      Ontario   New Brunswick   New England   New York  Total 
Autarky / Pre-1997 
Pre-1997 / Free trade 
343.2            31.3             21.3                 ~ 0                    1.4 
  51.1          203.4             68.8               35.2                    0.2 
397.2 
358.7 
 